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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
D. I-I. OLIVER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent_, 
vs. 
CHARLES LEE MITCHELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
9658 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Charles Lee Mitchell, appellant herein, petitions 
the Supreme Court of the State of lJtah for a rehearing 
in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76 (e), 
U.R.C.P. 
APPELLANT URGES THE COURT TO 
RECONSIDER, AND TO REVERSE, ITS 
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AS 
TO THE LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS HE 
HELD. 
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Ground for this petition is that the Opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in this case, filed 
November 30, 1962, does not discuss the point on which 
the appellant placed his greatest reliance. 
The vital fact is: At the time said waiver was made 
by appellant, the only issue was custody of appellant's 
funds, whether they should be released to appellant or 
retained under the restraint of a pre-judgment garnish-
ment. There had been at that time no trial of the case 
in chief. Execution, and waiver of execution, was not 
then under consideration. 
In support of this Petition, appellant relies on 
the Statementof Facts at pages 4 to 8, and Point II of 
his Argument at pages 13 to 19, in his original brief 
on appeal herein. Appellant urges, however, that these 
be considered in the light and context of his basic 
premise, that the act of waiver made by the defendant 
should be viewed in regard to the circumstances under 
which it was performed. 
The contention of appellant is, and has at all times 
been, that his offer of waiver was merely a waiver of 
his right to regain custody of all of his funds prior to 
trial. His waiver was a waiver of his claim of right to 
have a pre-judgment garnishment set aside. The waiver 
was intended only to make a temporary compromise 
of the issue of where his money should be held while 
awaiting trial. 
Appellant respectfully submits that if his original 
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brief on appeal is viewed in this context, that his argu-
ments n1ight well be more persuasive to the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Charles Lee Mitchell 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE METROPOLITAN 'VATER 
D I S T It I C T OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff~ Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant~ 
vs. 
S A L T LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation; J. BRACKEN LEE; 
L. C. ROMNEY; JOE L. CHRIS-
TENSEN; CONRAD B. HARRI-
SON; HERBERT F. SMART; and 
THORPE B. ISAACSON, 
Defendants~ Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents. 
Case No. 
9660 
Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The opening brief of appellants discussed only 
the ruling of the trial court that the Mayor of Salt 
Lake City was not the officer granting the power of 
appointing directors of the plaintiff. 
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Respondents answered this argument and then 
discussed the question of tenure and the lack of vacancy 
in the Board of Directors to which it is claimed that 
defendant Isaacson was appointed. This latter argu-
ment was made in respondent's capacity as cross-appel-
lant. 
Defendants then filed a brief attempting to answer 
this presentation. Hence it is now necessary for plain-
tiff to reply to the last brief of defendants and cross-
respondents. 
Although to some extent a repetition, in the hope 
it will be useful, we state again the facts which have 
resulted in these appeals and cross-appeals. 
The Metropolitan \~Vater District Act was passed 
by the Legislature of Utah (Chapter 110, Laws of 
Utah 1935). The Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City and those of Orem, Provo, American Fork, 
I~ehi and Pleasant Grove-Lindon came to existence 
under that Act by mandate of the electors of those 
cities and towns during that same year, each "a separate 
and independent political corporate entity" (73-8-3, 
U.C.A. 1953) vested with the broad and extensive 
powers enumerated in the Act, and each, with the sole 
exception of Pleasant Grove-Lindon, including the 
area of only one city or Inunicipality. 
The Act (73-8-20, U.C.A. 1953) provides that: 
"All powers, privileges and duties vested in or 
imposed upon any district, incorporated here-
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under shall be exercised and performed by and 
through a board of directors ... " 
As to the appointment of such directors that same 
section provided : 
"In the event that the district shall be or-
ganized to cmnprise the area of two or more 
cities, the board of directors herein referred to 
shall consist of at least one representative from 
each municipality, the area of which shall lie 
within the metropolitan water district. Such 
representatives shall serve without compensation 
from the district and shall be designated and 
appointed by the chief executive officers of mu"7 
nicipalities, respectively, with the consent and 
approval of the governing bodies of the munici-
palities, respectively . . . " 
That section of the Act closes with this: 
"If any district shall include the area of only 
one municipality then the board of directors shall 
consist of such number as the governing body of 
that municipality shall determine. All provisions 
of this section appropriate shall apply to such 
board." 
Section 20 also contains this: 
" ... immediately upon convening, such board 
of directors shall elect from its membership a 
chairman, a vice chairman and a secretary, who 
shall serve for a period of two years, or until 
sooner recalled or resigning~ or until his suc-
cessor shall -be elected and qualified." 
There is nothing else in the Metropolitan Water 
District Act touching the term of office of any director 
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or officer except the explicit provisions of Sec. 73-8-52, 
U.C.A. 1953 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935): 
"Recall and Resignation of Directors. 
Every member of the board of directors of a 
metropolitan water district formed hereunder 
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by 
the governing body of the municipality from 
which such member shall be appointed, and any 
member may resign from said board of.directors 
and any office held by him in said district." 
73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953 (Sec. 51 of the act of 
1935.) 
In 1935 the governing body of Salt Lake City 
passed an ordinance which provided for a board of 
seven and that the term of directors of the Metropolitan 
Water District of Salt Lake City should be six years, 
and from 1935 until June 19, 1941, appointments to 
the board of directors were stated to be of that dura-
tion. But on the latter date the ordinance of 1935 was 
repealed and an ordinance providing for a board of 
five and purporting to fix the term at four years was 
passed, and since then appointments to the District's 
board of directors have been stated to be for that period. 
Since 1941 no ordinance relating to the subject has 
been passed. 
All appointments have either been by the Mayor, 
as both ordinances expressly provided, and have been 
confirmed by the Board of Co1nmissioners of Salt Lake 
City or they have been "reconnnended" by him and 
have been agreed to by the other Commissioners. All 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have been reappointments unless to fill vacancies due 
to death or resignation. 
The Legislature of 1957 a1nended Sec. 73-8-52 
(Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) to read as follows, striking 
out the words "or without": 
"Recall and Resignation of Directors. 
Every mernber of the board of directors of a 
metropolitan water district formed hereunder 
shall be subject to recall for cause by the gov-
erning body of the municipality from which such 
member shall be appointed, and any member may 
resign from said board of directors and any office 
held by him in said district." (Chap. 159, L. 
1957). 
On recommendation of the Mayor, Charles C. 
Freed was appointed a member of the board of directors 
of the District on June 18, 1958, for a term purporting 
to terminate on June 19, 1961. 
On August 3, 1961, the Mayor of Salt Lake City 
nominated and with one dissenting vote the Board of 
Commissioners agreed to the appointment of defendant 
Isaacson to fill the vacancy said to existing by the end-
ing of the term of office by Charles C. Freed. 
At that time members of the Board of Commis-
sioners other than the Mayor were advised by the Act-
ing City Attorney that none of them had any right of 
nomination, and to this they accedec\. 
The "appointment" of defendant Isaacson was and 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is not recognized by the board of directors of the Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake City, because at 
the time of the purported appointment there was no 
vacancy on the District's board of directors and he was 
not appointed by the proper authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TENURE OF OFFICE OF MElVIBERS 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN AND NOW IS 
FIXED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT 
AND HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED BY SALT 
LAKE CITY ORDINANCES. 
The fundamental premises upon which plaintiff 
bases its argument in favor of a tenure during good 
behavior, and in consequence that the term of Charles 
C. Freed had not expired, are simple and clear. 
The Metropolitan Water District Act passed by 
the Legislature of 1935 itself fixed the term of office 
of directors of plaintiff. The term was at the will of 
"the governing body of the municipality." The power 
was given to the governing body of the municipality 
to recall a director "for or without cause" (73-8-52, 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935), and there 
was no way, by ordinance or otherwise, that the gov-
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erning body of the municipality could discard, avoid 
or destroy or deprive itself of that power which it alone 
could exercise, a power granted the governing body of 
the Inunicipality by the explicit and unambiguous 
language ·of the Legislature. Can anyone suggest any 
language Inore definite and certain or more obvious to 
the purpose 1 
"Recall and Resignation of Directors. 
Every member of the boar~ of directors of a 
metropolitan water district formed hereunder 
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by 
the governing body of the municipality from 
which such member shall be appointed, and any 
member may resign from said board of directors 
and any office held by him in said district." 
(73-8-52, U.C.j\.. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of 
1935.) 
The ordinances which the Board of Commissioners 
passed fixing the term first at six years and then at 
four, were without legal effect as to that. The govern-
ing body of the municipality could have appointed a 
director, saying and probably intending, for four years 
and have removed him within an hour. It could have 
appointed a director for six years or sixty and have 
removed him within an hour. Will anyone claim or has 
anyone claimed otherwise 1 
It is not sure and certain that had any director of 
the District been removed without cause prior to the 
completion of the term fixed by the six-year or the four-
year ordinance and the removal had been questioned-
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is it not sure and certain that in such case defendants 
would have been l~ere successfully citing the provisions 
of U.C.A. 73-8-52 as originally written in support of 
such removal, despite the Ordinances, instead of the 
same being cited by us with equal confidence and con-
sequence in support of its original clear and obvious 
import and its equally clear, obvious and decisive im-
port as amended? Ill 
Regardless of what is argued, the simple fact 
remains that prior to 1957 directors of plaintiff held 
their offices at the will and whim of the Commission, 
a the governing body of the municipality from which 
such member shall be appointed."'"' The four-year and 
six-year term ordinances could not rise higher than 
declarations of policy. City ordinances cannot repeal 
an Act of the Legislature. 
The provisions of Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, 
enacted in 1935 as Sec. 51, are not unusual. Many 
officers ,both in public and private life, hold their jobs 
at the will of someone, ordinarily the appointing power. 
Cabinet members hold their positions at the will of 
the President. Many of the officers under the state gov-
ernment are held at the will of the Governor, county 
employees at the will of county officers making the 
appointment. 
The city ordinances providing from 1935 to 1941 
that the term should be for six years, and from 1941 to 
1957 that it should be four, could not and did not take 
away the power of the governing body of the munici-
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pality to re1nove without cause; that is to say: the Legis-
lature having expressly provided that a every member 
of the board of directors of a metropolitan water district 
j'orrned heretttnder shall be subject to recall for or with-
ottd cause by the governing body of the municipality 
from which such member shall be appointed/~ that was 
final and conclusive as to the term to which directors 
could be appointed, and was not subject to repeal or 
a1nendment by a city ordinance. 
The statute fixed the term then as it does now, 
and no ordinance could or can enlarge or restrict it. 
The governing body of the City could, of course, 
decline to exercise the power granted it, and it actually 
did, but it could not divest itself of the power conferred 
upon it. 
That the governing body of the city felt that its 
ordinance of 1935, fixing the term of office of members 
of the board of directors of the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City at six years was no more than 
a declaration of policy and that Sec. 73-8-52 of the 
statute was controlling, is clearly evinced by the fact 
that in 1941 its policy was revised. On June 19 of that 
year it repealed the ordinance of 1935, which provided 
for a term of six years, and enacted an ordinance pro-
viding that the term of office should be four years. 
Members of the District's board of directors then 
in office were thus and then recalled, summarily and 
without hearing, without cause, as the statute expressly 
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provided they could be, and those appointed under the 
ordinance of 1941 were said to be appointed for a dif-
ferent term-four years instead of six. It so happens 
that the ordinance has not since been changed. At the 
same time, it is evident that in view of the original pro-
visions of Sec. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) 
no ordinance at all was necessary or could be legally 
effective as to the term of office. The policy of the 
governing body could have been varied from time to 
time as circumstances or opinion might direct. But no 
ordinance, resolution or expression of intent of the city, 
formal or informal, could affect the Act of the Legis-
lature, could be as to it of any legal consequence what-
ever. 
That the ordinances were of PRACTICAL effect 
cannot be doubted. Such was their purpose. 
To have passed the ordinances in question, so far 
as they relate to the term of office, for any other pur-
pose or to suppose them to be in that behalf anything 
other than declarations of a policy not binding upon 
the declarant or anyone else- to have passed those 
ordinances for any other purpose or supposed effect 
in the face of Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the 
Act of 1935, would have been utterly ridiculous, UN-
MITIGATED NONSENSE. 
Though probably not material: Is anyone opposing 
us here and now so naive as to suppose that the City 
Attorney who prepared the ordinance of 1935 was 
unaware of what prior to 1957 were the provisions of 
10 
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Sec. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) or that they 
were unknown to him who drafted that of 1941? 
"Recall and Resignation of Directors. 
Every member of the board of directors of a 
Inetropolitan water district formed ]lereunder 
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by 
the governing body of the municipality from 
which such member shall be appointed, and any 
member may resign from said board of directors 
and any office held by him in said district." 
( 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of 
1935). 
That language, not the ordinances_, fixed the term 
of office of the members of the board of directors of the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, and 
everyone who knew anything of the subject was well 
aware of it. 
The Legislature of 1957, becoming aware of the 
possible evil effect of ITS declaration of policy, changed 
the law of the subject by deleting the words "or with-
out", thus depriving the governing body of the muni-
cipality of power to remove a director without cause, 
and re-enacted the section with that one only change: 
"Recall and Resignation of Directors. 
Every member of the board of directors of a 
metropolitan water district formed hereunder 
shall be subject to recall for ca1tse by the gov-
erning body of the municipality from which such 
n1ember shall be appointed, and any member may 
resign from said board of directors and any office 
11 
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held by him in said district." (73-8-52, U.C.A. 
1953; Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935, as amended 
by the Legislature of 1957) . 
Theretofore appointments made to the District's 
Board of Directors, as a matter of form, had been for a 
term of six years from 1935 to 1941, and for a term of 
four years after 1941. But the terms thus and then 
declared were without legal effect. The statute ( 73-8-52, 
Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) was controlling; and there-
after the Statute was and is still controlling; with the 
result that the directors appointed subsequent to 1957 
hold office as the Legislature than directed. 
The amendment went into effect May 14, 1957 as 
Chapter 159, Laws of Utah 1957. On June 18, 1958 
Mr. Charles C. Freed was appointed to serve, as the 
Legislature provided, until recalled for cause. 
Some do not approve of a term of office during 
good behavior. Their quarrel and recourse we suggest 
is with the Legislature. 
At the same time it is worthy of notice and con-
sideration that members of the board of directors of 
the Metropolitan Water District are among our fore-
most citizens, that they serve without compensation 
other than the satisfaction derived from work well done, 
that their obligations have been satisfied with fidelity, 
integrity and efficiency, as has been publicly acknowl-
edged even by him whose avowed purpose is to destroy 
them. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again, as to the District itself: it cannot as a matter 
of law be a dum1ny of the City the boundaries of which 
aie,contenninous with its own. Instead, it must be, as 
the Metropolitan VVater District Act provides, "a sepa-
rate and independeni political corporate entity", an 
entity which, as this court declared in Lehi City v. 
Meiling, reported in 87 Utah, is "an agency of the 
state". That it should be so in fact as well as in legal 
theory was the purpose of those responsible for the 
preparation and passage of the original ordinance of 
1935, a purpose which, in practical effect, as distin-
guished from legal, was accomplished. 
It was in furtherance of such purpose in legal and 
conclusive effect that the Legislature of 1957 amended 
Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953; Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935. 
It may be asked why the Legislature took so long 
to make the amendment in question. The answer is that 
prior to 1957 it was not brought to legislative attention, 
and-assuming that which we think to be absurd, that 
it was aware of the actual practice-under the ordi-
nances passed by Salt Lake City that actual practice 
was not inconsistent with that which in 1957 was de-
clared to be the policy of the Legislature concerning the 
term of office of directors of metropolitan water dis-
tricts. In actual practice directors were appointed and 
reappointed, and none of them were ever removed from 
office either with or without cause. Certainly it was 
of no concern to the directors themselves that they were, 
as a matter of form, appointed for definite periods of 
13 
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time, even though the statute specifically limited the 
duration of their term. 
Iri the statement above we have used the expression 
"assuming that which we think to be absurd." We refer 
to those cases which hold the Legislature is presumed 
to know the fact and effect of municipal ordinances, 
when there are in Utah 214 municipalities, in addition 
to the 29 counties. 
It seems appropriate at this point to dispose of 
defendants' claim that plaintiff's interpretation of Sec. 
73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, as amended i? 1957, is incon-
sistent with the taxing power of the District as pro-
vided in the Metropolitan Water District Act. 
POINT II 
THE 1957 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 
73-8-52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
CONSTRUED AS PLAINTIFF CONTENDS 
IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ENACT-
MENT. 
This statement is the exact opposite of Point II 
of Defendants' brief commencing on page 17, to which 
this is our reply. Defendants' counsel devotes six pages 
of the brief to this point, but our respect for counsel 
is such that we feel confident that the considerations 
to which we are about to advert, being called to his at-
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tention ,he would gladly erase those six pages. He states 
(page 17): 
"If the 1957 Amendment is construed to give 
tenure during good behavior to members of an 
administrative board that have authority to levy 
taxes, the amendment is unconstitutional in that 
it places power in a special commission to levy 
taxes in violation of Article VI, Section 29 of 
the Utah Constitution. The concept of imbuing 
a non-representative body with taxing authority 
is completely contrary to the fundamental prin-
ciples of American government." 
He follows this, however (page 21) with this: 
"Defendants are well aware that the constitu-
tionality of the Metropolitan Water District Act 
was tested and upheld in the case of Lehi City v. 
Meiling, 87 Utah, 237, 48 P.2d, 530, against the 
specific contention that the district constituted 
a special commission in violation of the Consti-
tution. However, a reading of the Meiling case 
indicates clearly that the court based its decision 
of the fact that the Legislature had not delegated 
the taxing power to this district board of direc-
tors but rather, in making the adoption of a 
metropolitan water district optional within each 
area to be created only upon a vote of the electo-
rate had left the choice to the people and the 
people themselves delegated the power to the 
district." 
Will defendants, upon reflection, still contend that 
the power to dismiss directors of the Metropolitan 
"\Vater District "without cause" was any protection 
to the taxpayers? We think not, for quite the opposite 
is at once quite apparent. 
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Still further, defendants and their counsel appar-
ently are not aware of those provisions of the Metro-
politan Water District Act to which we are about to 
refer providing adequate safeguards against an abuse 
of the taxing power which if abused by the board of 
directors of the district would subject them to recall 
for cause. 
Sec. 73-8-22, U .C.A. 1953, prohibits the incurrence 
by the district of any indebtedness the payment for 
which would require recourse to taxation, without sub-
mitting the proposal to incur such indebtedness to the 
vote of the taxpaying electorate. For convenience we 
quote from it at length: 
"Whenever the board of directors of any met-
ropolitan water district incorporat~d under this 
act shall, by ordinance adopted by a vote of a 
majority of the aggregate number of votes of 
all the members of the board of directors, deter-
mine that the interests of said district and the 
public interest or necessity demand the acquisi-
tion, construction or completion of any source 
of water supply, water, waterworks or other im-
proveinent, works or facility, or the making of 
any contract with the United States or othe1· 
persons or corporations, or the incurring of any 
preliminary expense, necessary or convenient to 
carry out the objects or purposes of said district 
wherein an indebtedness or obligation shall be 
created to satisfy which shall require a greater 
expenditure than the ordinary annual incmne 
and revenue of the district shall permit, said 
board of directors may order the submission of 
the proposition of incurring such obligation or 
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bonded or other indebtedness, for the purposes 
set forth in the said ordinance, to such qualified 
electors of such district as shall have paid a prop-
erty tax in the year preceding such election, at an 
election held for that purpose." 
Again, Sec. 73-8-31 provides: 
''The board of directors shall fix such rate or 
rates for the water furnished as will, in con-
junction with the proceeds of the maintenance 
and operation tax authorized by Section 73-1-18 
( i) above, pay the operating expenses of the 
district, provide for repairs and depreciation of 
works owned or operated by such district, pay 
the interest of any bonded or other debt, and so 
far as practicable, provide a sinking or other 
fund for the payment of the principal of such 
debt as the same may become due; it being the 
intention of this section to require the district to 
pay the interest and principal of its indebtedness 
from the revenues of such district, so far as 
practicable." 
Transgression of either of these sections of the 
Act would be occasion for recall for cause. 
Can it be claimed with any semblance of reason that 
the deletion from 73-8-52 of the words "or without" 
detracts in any sense or degree from what this court 
held in Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, as set forth by 
counsel for defendants? 
The writer is not at all sure that this Court as such 
is a ware of the fallowing: 
Nevertheless, in 1937 when the District's board of 
directors, after careful and exhaustive examination of 
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all other possibilities, determined that its first and fun-
damental water supply was to be derived from the 
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation by a subscription to the capital stock of 
Provo River ·water Users Association, it submitted 
the proposal to incur the indebtedness involved to the 
vote of the people; so also as to the construction of the 
41-mile Salt Lake Aqueduct from the Deer Creek 
Reservoir to Salt I~ake City, at the then estimated cost 
of $3,534,000 as to the subscription; $5,550,000 as to 
the Aqueduct; in each case reciting in the ordinance 
calling the election, that the payment of the indebted-
ness proposed to be incurred would "require a greater 
expenditure than the ordinary annual income and 
revenue of the District would permit." 
Again, in 1946, when the Contracts, on account 
of rising costs, had to be amended to increase the cost 
of the Aqueduct to $8,043,650, and of the subscription 
contract to $5,301,000. 
And still again, in 1958, when it was proposed to 
construct the District's water treatment plant at an 
estimated cost of $8,000,000. 
In each instance the proposition to incur the indebt-
edness was submitted to vote of the people, and it would 
not and could not have been incurred without their 
consent. Nor can any other indebtedness requiring 
recourse to taxation, that is to say, any indebtedness 
"to satisfy which shall require a greater expenditure 
than the ordinary annual income and revenue of the 
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District shall permit" be incurred without the consent 
of the people. 
It Inay be of interest to notice that on each occasion 
1nore of the electors of the District voted on the pro-
posals than in any other special elections ever held in 
Salt Lake City, and that in each case the incurrence 
of the proposed indebtedness was approved almost 
without dissent. 
As it has turned out, Directors of the District (as 
we believe this Court does know), heeding their obli-
gation of office and the admonitions of Sec. 73-8-31, 
have conducted its business with such efficiency that 
no recourse to taxation, though authorized, for the 
discharge of any of the indebtedness to which we have 
referred, has been necessary or has been imposed, the 
District never having levied a tax in excess of that for 
opertaion and maintenance as that section provides. 
In any event, it is clear that the legislative amend-
ment of 1957, fixing the term of the members of the 
board of directors of the district until such time as 
they may be discharged for cause, not only does not 
impeach but has no relation whatever to the decision 
of this court in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 
48 P.2d 530, as accurately stated by defendants' counsel 
at page 21 of their brief which we have quoted above. 
It is also perfectly evident that the power of "the 
governing body of the municipality" to recall members 
of the district's board of directors without cause was 
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fundamentally wrong and that restriction of that power 
to recall only "for cause" was appropriate. 
Again, from Lehi City v. Meiling, supra: It was 
there held that districts formed pursuant to the Metro-
politan Water District Act are not "special commis-
siOns, private corporations or associations." 
"It is contended that the act is unconstitu-
tional as an attempt to unlawfully delegate the 
power of taxation t_o a special commission and 
to interfere in city and town affairs in violation 
of the provisions of Article 6, Sec. 29, which 
reads as follows: 
'The Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site or to perform any municipal func-
tions.' 
"This contention cannot be sustained for the 
reason that the Board of Directors to whom the 
manage1nent and control of the district has been 
intrusted, and which is to exercise the powers 
and perform the functions of the public agency 
thus created, does not come within the designa-
tion 'special commission, private corporation or 
association' to which the inhibitions of the sec-
tion apply. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 
supra. Nor does the act provide for interference 
with any municipal improvement, money, prop-
erty, or effects. The power of control vested in 
the board of directors is over the property, im-
proveinents, money and effects of the district, 
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and not that of any of the cities or towns whose 
territorial boundaries may be coincidental with 
that of the district or included therein. The 
powers of the board are limited by the act to 
the levying of taxes for the public purposes men-
tioned therein. 
"None of the municipal functions of the com-
ponent cities or towns is conferred on or dele-
gated to the Metropolitan Water District. Each 
of such cities and towns will possess and may 
continue to exercise every municipal function 
it now has. There need be no frictoin between 
the two, but the closest cooperatoin is contem-
plated and should result. 
"Objection is urged that the members of the 
board are not elected by the electors of the dis-
trict b1d are appointed by the governing authori-
ties of the cities or towns as representatives of 
such tnunicipalities. We, however, find no pro-
vision of the Constitution which limits the power 
of the Legislature for the governing or control 
of such public agencies by officers selected in 
the manner provided rather than by election. In 
the absence of constitutional provision control-
ling legislative action in this respect, the choice 
of methods by which the governing body may 
be selected is within the discretion of the Legis-
lature. If it be objected that the Legislature in 
this manner is usurping some of the powers of 
local self-government, the answer is that before 
a Metropolitan Water District can be organized 
it must have a majority vote of the electors 
within the district in support thereof and such 
vote carries with it an approval of the method 
by which the officers of the district shall be 
selected. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 
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supra; Metropolitan Water District of South-
ern California v. Burney, supra." 
As to Defendant's Argument That There Has Been a 
Practical and Administrative Construction of the Met-
ropolitan Water District Act. 
Defendants stress their reliance upon what they 
characterize "as a practical and administrative" con-
struction of the Metropolitan Water District Act. 
There has been none. Untill961 defendants (and their 
predecessors) have acted except in 1941 as though their 
ordinances were the paramount law, but the members 
of the District's board of driectors, though appointed 
and reappointed for stated terms without a break in the 
continuity of their service, have always been well aware 
of the fact that their term of office was limited by the 
lVIetropolitan Water District Act, that it was at the 
will of "the governing body of the municipality." They 
have never assumed or asserted otherwise. There has 
been "a practical administrative" construction of a leg-
islative enactment only when its terms are susceptibl~ 
of different interpretations and one or the other has 
been adopted and for long has met with acquiescence. 
Here neither the terms or effect of the legislative en-
actments (73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953; Sec. 51 of the Act 
of 1935) or that of 1957 are susceptible of different 
interpretations, nor until the filing of defenadants' 
brief has anyone questioned their objectively clear 
meaning, purpose or effect. "Can anyone suggest any 
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language n1ore definite and certain or more obvious to 
the purpose?" 
As to the Defendants' Argument That the Ap-
pointing Power May Fix the Term of Office. 
They forget their stand that the Mayor alone is 
vested with the power of appointment and that he has 
fixed no term. Instead it is their contention that the 
term has been set, not by him or by the Legislature, but 
by the governing body of the municipality. 
POINT III. 
THE MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY IS 
NOT ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OR 
THE PERSON DESIGNATED AS THE AP-
POINTING POWER BY SECTION 73-8-20, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
It will be noticed that the authority granted "the 
chief executive officers of municipalities" is limited by 
the language "In the event that the district shall be 
organized to comprise the area of two or more cities." 
The last paragraph of the section reads: 
"If any district shall include the area of only 
one municipality then the board of directors 
shall consist of such number as the governing 
body of that municipality shall determine. All 
provisions of this section appropriate shall apply 
to such board." 
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We suggest that it is not at all clear that "All 
provisions of this section appropriate shall apply to 
such board," is applicable to the power conferred upon 
the chief executive officer "In the event that the district 
shall be organized to comprise the area of two or more 
cities." 
Certainly we think the conclusion of the trial court 
as to that and that the governing body is the appointing 
power for a one-city district may not be lightly rejected, 
especially in view of the fact that this last paragraph, 
relating to a district which includes, as here, "the area 
of only one municipality" expressly confers upon "the 
governing body" the right to determine the number of 
directors. The "chief executive officer" is not so much 
as mentioned in that paragraph nor is he in any other 
part of the Act, though "the governing body" fre-
quently is. 
As to the Mayor not being the "chief executive 
officer" of the municipality, we base our opinion as to 
that on the Statute (10-6-14, U.C.A. 1953) as here-
tofore eleborated: 
"The executive and administrative powers, 
authority and duties in such cities shall be dis-
tributed into and among five departments as fol-
lows" (enumerating them). 
It is common for the Mayor to be in practical effect 
the civic leader and the dominant person on the board of 
commissioners, and he is as a matterof tradition and 
custom the civic "greeter." But it would be easy for any-
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one familiar with local1nunicipal affairs to name mayors 
who have not been leaders or dominant in any sense or 
degree, and it would be easy to enumerate mayors ~ho 
against their will have been assigned to one or the other 
of city departments by others of the board of commis-
sioners; but in any event there is no legal sanction in 
cities of the first class for the proposition that the 
Mayor is "the chief executive officer of the municipal-
ity." 
It is true, as defendants claim, that the District's 
board of directors have made no objection to the usurpa-
tion by the Mayor of the sole power of nomination to 
the District's board, nor to the terms of fixed duration. 
But it was of no concern to the District or its board 
of directors that other members of the board of com-
missioners might or might not have surrendered exer-
cise of their prerogatives to one of their number, or in 
view of the provisions of Sec. 73-8-52 that the term of 
office was stated to be such as violated the provisiOns 
of that section. 
Appointments having as a matter of form been 
made for terms of definite duration, the Board certainly 
had no cause for complaint, because those terms were 
for a greater period of time than that fixed by the 
statute, and so as a practical matter afforded them some 
small measure of security to which they were entitled. 
It may be noted~ however~ that Sec. 73-8-52 having 
been amended~ as the Legislature of 1957 did~ that as 
soon as an attempt was made to limit the term for a 
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tirne less or different than that fixed by the .statute~ this 
action was immediately filed. 
It would be supererogatory, perhaps even offensive, 
to cite authority to the effect that it is not the function 
of the Court to pass upon the wisdom of legislation, 
and certainly it does not devolve upon counsel to do so. 
The Metropolitan Water District Act, taken from 
that under which was organized the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California, including the area of 
upwards of fifty cities and towns, is not perfectly ap-
propriate to local conditions, and especially not to a 
district embracing the area of only one municipality. 
The very section, U.C.A. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act 
of 1935) upon which we rely, as it was originally enacted 
by the Legislature, was and always has been repugnant 
to the ideas and purposes of those active and respon-
sible for the creation of the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict of Salt Lake City, but it is and was, as originally 
written, as well as amended in 1957, controlling and 
decisive of this controversy. 
In Southern California it was of no practical sig-
nificance because the arbitrary removal "for or without 
cause" of those directors from Azusa, Anaheim or Bur-
bank would not impeach the integrity of the board of 
directors itself. Nevertheless, Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 
1953 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) was "the law of the 
land" until 1957. 
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The ordinances of 1935 and 1941 sought to alleviate 
1n practical effect the possible consequence of that 
section as originally enacted, and in practical effect they 
have alleviated it. They could not, however, affect its 
clear and obvious legal consequence; but the Legislature 
could and did~ by the amendment of that section of the 
Metropolitan Water District Act in 1957, with the 
obvious objective purpose and conclusive effect of obvi-
ating the possibility of those acts the occasion of this 
litigation-the arbitrary and capricious removal of a 
director of experience, outstanding merit and proven 
worth, without cause, without reason, or excuse. The 
result is inevitable, that when the appointment of the 
defendant Isaacson was sought in June of 1961 there 
was no vacancy on the District's board of directors. 
POINT IV. 
THE APPOINTMENT OF ISAACSON IS 
INVALID. 
In their Point III defendants take the position 
that the ordinances of 193.5 and 1941 must be all good 
or all bad. This contention is absurd. 
The governing body of Salt Lake City has express 
authority to fix the number of directors to sit and hold 
office on plaintiff's board. The ordinances were passed 
fixing the number. There is no reason in the world why 
this provision of the ordinances should not be held valid. 
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The contention of plaintiff is that neither the gov-
erning body of the municipality nor anyone else had 
the power to fix the term of office since it had already 
been fixed by the statute and for the further reason 
that to have permitted the fixing of a term would elimi-
nate the power granted by the Legislature to remove at 
any time without cause. This was changed by the Legis-
lature of 1957 so that the powers of removal can, as to 
appointments since made, only be based upon cause. 
To permit the removal of a director by fixing a term 
would result in removal without cause. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
trial court refusing to recognize the validity of Isaac-
son's appointment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FISHER HARRIS 
E. RAY CHRISTENSEN 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
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